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HOW HAS THE AFFORDABLE 
CARE ACT AFFECTED WORK 
AND WAGES?
Jean Abraham, PhD and Anne Beeson Royalty, PhD
January 2017 . Vol. 21, No. 3
One of the most contentious issues around the Affordable Care Act (ACA) was how it would 
influence labor supply and demand, the structure of jobs, and compensation. Whether the ACA 
is revised, repealed, replaced, or remains intact, it is important to understand how federal health 
reform affects the U.S. labor market.  In this issue brief, we summarize the evidence regarding the 
impact of the ACA on these employment outcomes, and identify challenges and opportunities for 
further research.
ACA PROVISIONS THAT COULD INFLUENCE  
EMPLOYMENT OUTCOMES
The ACA increased individuals’ access to insurance through a variety of mechanisms that could 
also affect employment outcomes.  The law expanded access to private insurance for young adults; 
broadened eligibility criteria for Medicaid in states that chose to expand; introduced subsidized 
private insurance in newly-created Marketplaces; and created a new regulatory environment for 
private insurance markets.  
Young Adults. Adopted in September 2010, the young adult dependents provision allows 
individuals up to age 26 to enroll in their parents’ health plan. The provision could affect young 
adults’ employment in a number of ways: it might alter their incentives to work in jobs that offer 
employer-sponsored insurance (ESI); it might reduce their labor supply if they can work fewer hours 
and maintain the same standard of living because they don’t explicitly pay for their own health 
insurance; and it might increase wages if they move to jobs without insurance or if employers with 
many young adult workers drop coverage and compensate by raising wages.
Income-based coverage expansions. In January 2014, 25 states and the District of Columbia 
expanded eligibility for Medicaid to individuals with incomes below 138% of the Federal Poverty 
Level (FPL).  Access to private coverage also expanded with the introduction of income-based 
premium and cost-sharing subsidies for individual coverage offered in newly-created Marketplaces. 
These coverage expansions could encourage individuals to reduce their labor supply and incomes 
to either qualify for Medicaid or increase their subsidies on the Marketplace. In addition, because of 
improved access to health insurance separate from the employer-based system, workers might have 
greater mobility and flexibility, including the choice to work at small firms, which are less likely to 
offer health insurance, or self-employment.   
Employer incentives. The ACA included several provisions designed to maintain or expand 
the existing employer-based system. The employer shared responsibility requirement (ESRR) 
hedged against the possibility that employers would drop health insurance they offer and send 
their workers to the Marketplace.  Specifically, firms with at least 50 full-time equivalent workers 
face an annualized penalty of $2,000 per full-time employee receiving a premium tax credit on 
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the Marketplace. The ESRR also includes financial penalties for large employers that offer 
“unaffordable” coverage based on a measure of out-of-pocket premiums relative to a worker’s 
household income. The ESRR was delayed and revised in terms of its phase-in for mid-sized 
(50-99 workers) and large firms (100 or more workers). To encourage insurance offers among 
small, low-wage firms, the ACA included a small business tax credit. While these provisions were 
meant to affect employers’ economic incentives to offer insurance, two other possible employer 
responses include changing their demand for labor (e.g., reducing the number of workers and 
firm size) and modifying the structure of jobs (e.g., shifting from full-time to part-time workers or 
using more temporary or contract workers).   
New Regulatory Environment. Several new regulations were introduced for the individual 
and small employer market segments in 2014, including essential health benefits, standardized 
products (“metal levels”), modified community rating (rating only on age, tobacco use, family 
composition, and geography), and a prohibition on insurers denying coverage to individuals 
with pre-existing conditions.  The employment effects of this new regulatory environment span 
both labor supply and compensation.  Notably, they might increase the likelihood that older 
workers choose to retire prior to age 65, when most become eligible for Medicare. They might 
also affect workers’ wages if small employers face higher premiums because of a broad set of 
essential health benefits or modified community rating. Finally, the ACA included an excise tax 
on the high cost health plans (“Cadillac Tax”) to discourage employers from offering extremely 
generous policies that most economists believe encourage overconsumption of medical care 
by individuals.  Originally proposed for 2018, the Cadillac Tax is now delayed until 2020. If 
implemented, it is likely that affected employers would reduce the generosity of health insurance 
offerings and possibly increase other forms of compensation such as wages.   
The following table summarizes these key provisions and their hypothesized effects on 
employment outcomes.
KEY PROVISIONS OF THE 
ACA DESIGNED TO INCREASE 
EMPLOYER INCENTIVES 
TO OFFER INSURANCE 
COULD ALSO AFFECT THE 
DEMAND FOR LABOR AND 
THE STRUCTURE OF JOBS.
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TABLE 1. 
Employment 
Category
ACA Provision(s) that can affect this 
employment category
Employment Outcome 
(Hypothesized Overall 
Effect)
Summary of Published 
Literature
Labor Supply •  Young adult dependent coverage 
expansion (2010)
•  Medicaid eligibility expansion (2014)
•  Subsidized Marketplace coverage (2014)
•  Individual market regulations  
(e.g., modified community rating,  
ban pre-existing conditions) (2014)
Any employment (-)
Usual hours per week (-)
Part-time (+)
Retirement (+) 
None of the hypothesized 
effects were detected.  The 
one exception was Antwi 
et al. (2013) found a decline 
in usual hours per week for 
young adults.
Job Mobility •  Young adult dependent coverage 
expansion (2010)
•  Medicaid eligibility expansion (2014)
•  Subsidized Marketplace coverage (2014)
Switching jobs (+)
Self-employment (+)
None of the hypothesized 
effects were detected.  
Insufficient evidence for 
self employment outcomes.
Labor 
Demand
•  Employer shared responsibility requirement 
(2015/2016)
Percentage of part-time 
workers (+)
Number of workers  
at firm (-)
Insufficient evidence to 
establish labor demand 
effects of the ACA.
Compensation •  Young adult dependent coverage 
expansion (2010)
•  Small employer health tax credit (2010)
•  Essential health benefits and modified 
community rating regulations (2014)
•  Employer shared responsibility requirement 
(2015/2016)
•  Individual mandate (2014)
•  Cadillac Tax (2020)
Wages (+/-)
ESI Offers (+/-)
ESI Eligibility (-)
WAGES: no impact on 
wages from the young 
adult dependent coverage 
mandate and Insufficient 
evidence for 2014 coverage 
expansion provisions.
OFFERS: Stable
ELIGIBILITY: no 
association detected
CURRENT EVIDENCE ON ACA AND EMPLOYMENT OUTCOMES
Employment and Hours of Work
Three studies have utilized difference-in-difference estimation techniques to compare changes 
in employment outcomes in response to the young adult mandate for those affected by the 
policy (e.g., 19-25 years old) to those who are similar but not affected.   Antwi, Moriya, and Simon 
(2013) found that the policy was associated with no effect on employment, a 3% reduction in usual 
hours of work, and a 5.8% reduction in the probability of working full-time. However, the authors 
acknowledged that the results were suggestive, since employment outcomes were not the focus 
of the paper. Using longitudinal tax records from 2008-2012 and difference-in-differences models, 
Heim, Lurie, and Simon (2015) linked tax records of parents and children to identify parents with 
access to ESI, and found no changes in employment and wages linked to the young adult provision. 
Bailey and Chorny (2016) used monthly Current Population Survey (CPS) data from May 2008 
to June 2013 to examine whether the young adult mandate encouraged individuals’ propensity to 
change jobs, and found no effect.     
Three studies investigated the impact of the 2014 coverage expansion provisions on employment 
and hours of work.  Moriya, Selden, and Simon (2016) used the 2005-2015 CPS to look at trends 
in part-time work. Overall, they found no evidence of a shift toward part-time work, but note some 
imprecise evidence of a shift for those with less education and older workers 60 to 64 years of age.  
Using the 2008-2014 CPS, Mathur, Slovov, and Strain (2016) examined the impact of the ACA on 
part-time work (defined as working 25-29 hours versus 31-35 hours) for industries and occupations 
most likely to be affected by the coverage expansion, and again, found no effects. However, their 
data extended only to 2014, before the employer mandate went into effect.  Using 2005-2015 CPS 
data, Gooptu et al. (2016) investigated whether individuals in Medicaid expansion states exhibited 
changes in any employment, part-time employment, or job switching, and found no  evidence 
of any employment responses overall or for those in lower income groups (versus higher income 
groups).   
Several working papers have also examined hours of work. Kaestner et al. (NBER Working Paper 
2015) analyzed usual hours of work and the probability of full-time work (> 30 hours per week) for 
a sample of 22-64 year olds with a high school degree or less. They found almost no effects on 
either employment outcome in the post-coverage expansion period, a result in line with most of 
the published work. On the other hand, two working papers focus on part-time employment and 
found substantially different results.  Unlike the published papers, these studies distinguish between 
voluntary part-time employment and involuntary part-time employment (the result of employers 
shifting workers from full-time to part-time). Even and Macpherson (2016) use data 1994-2015 
CPS data on non-elderly workers without a college degree to estimate the average percentage 
that are in involuntary part-time employment and whether this percentage is higher than expected 
in 2014. Dillender, Heinrich, and Houseman (2016) examine involuntary part-time employment as 
well, but their design relies upon the fact that Hawaii already had in place an employer mandate 
and therefore could serve as a comparison group to other U.S. states.  Both studies find evidence 
of increases in involuntary part-time employment in occupations and industries that are most likely 
to be affected by the ESRR. Notably, these papers have to assume that employers were already 
responding to the ESRR before it went into full effect.  
A final working paper focuses on the effect of the ACA coverage expansion on part-time work 
and retirement decisions among older workers.  Levy, Buchmueller, and Nikpay (2015) found no 
evidence to suggest either an increase in part-time work or an increased probability of retirement 
among those 55-64 years of age in states that expanded Medicaid versus those that did not.  
MANY OF THE ANTICIPATED 
EFFECTS OF THE ACA 
ON EMPLOYMENT DID 
NOT MATERIALIZE.
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Compensation 
Evidence on the impact of the ACA on workers’ compensation, including health insurance and 
wages, is more limited. Blavin et al. (2015) examined trends in access to ESI between June 2013 
and September 2014, and found no changes in rates of ESI offers overall as well as by firm size 
or family income level.  Recent work by Abraham, Royalty, and Drake (2016) uses the 2014 
Medical Expenditure Panel Survey-Insurance Component to examine changes in health insurance 
offers among private-sector U.S. employers. The authors found that more than 95 percent of 
establishments either continued offering coverage or continued not offering coverage between 
2013 and 2014. Fewer than 3.5 percent of establishments dropped coverage and 1.1 percent added 
coverage. Establishments that dropped coverage were disproportionately small and low-wage. 
The authors found no effects of state-level ACA policy variables (e.g., Medicaid income eligibility 
changes, modified community rating in the small group market, and Marketplace type) on the 
probability of dropping or adding health insurance offers.  
Thus far, little evidence exists on the effect of ACA on workers’ wages.  Heim, Lurie, and Simon 
(2015) found that the young adult mandate had no significant effect on the wages of young adults. 
On the other hand, a working paper by Goda, Farid, and Bhattacharya (2016) compared states that 
had mandated young adult dependent coverage before the ACA, with states newly implementing 
the ACA mandate, and found a negative effect of the ACA young adult mandate on wages. 
Surprisingly, the estimated effect was significant only among non-parents. 
Summary
In summary, with only one exception, the literature published to date finds virtually no effect of 
the ACA on employment, hours of work, ESI offers, job mobility, or wages in the first two years. 
Some working papers are in accord with the published literature while at least two come to different 
conclusions about the effect of the ACA on involuntary part-time employment. Research will 
continue as more data become available, and estimated effects may change over time.
CHALLENGES FOR THE RESEARCH COMMUNITY
Researchers evaluating the impact of the ACA on employment outcomes face a number of 
challenges.   We briefly describe three of them below.
Isolating the Effect of Specific ACA Provisions on Employment Outcomes.  Since many ACA 
provisions were enacted on a national level at the same time, it is often challenging for researchers 
to design studies that can provide estimates of the causal effect of the policy, and difficult if not 
impossible to isolate the effect of any one provision on an outcome of interest.  
Data and Measurement Challenges.  Measurement issues persist with respect to key outcomes 
(e.g., hours of work that tend to have “heaping” at round numbers) and a lack of standardization 
regarding how one classifies full-time versus part-time status. Researchers also face challenges in 
measuring how policies are implemented. For example, while researchers studying the impact of 
Marketplaces on employment outcomes may be able to capture structural measures about type 
(e.g., federally-facilitated versus state-based), it may be more difficult to measure how well or poorly 
a Marketplace was implemented, which might influence outcomes.  
Uncertainty in the Environment and Timeframe. It is hard to know the extent to which many 
“null” or small results are driven by the political uncertainty related to ACA implementation, 
including the Supreme Court decisions, delay in implementation of the ESRR, and the continued 
volatility of Marketplaces in these initial years.  As time passes, it will become increasingly difficult to 
evaluate the ACA impacts as new legislation and/or regulations begin to confound employer and 
THE ACA HAS HAD VIRTUALLY 
NO EFFECTS ON EMPLOYMENT, 
HOURS WORKED, ESI OFFERS, 
JOB MOBILITY, OR WAGES. 
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individual decisions. Uncertainty about the future of the ACA has only become more acute after 
Trump’s victory in the Presidential election and the Republicans’ continued control of the Senate 
since it is unclear what exactly will replace the law if, as expected, the current law is repealed.
DISCUSSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH NEEDS 
Our review of the current evidence suggests that the effect of the ACA on employment, hours of 
work, and compensation have been negligible, to date. However, the published work, of necessity, 
used only early years of data, so additional research is needed to follow up on these studies.  If the 
ACA remains in place at least in the short run, useful future work would include investigation of 
how employment and hours of work are affected by Marketplace functioning over time.  Second, 
full implementation of the ESRR did not occur until 2016. Work will be needed to understand 
employers’ responses, including whether firm sizes are changing around the 50 full-time equivalent 
threshold and whether insurance provision (e.g., offers and eligibility) is changing based upon 
longer-run Marketplace functioning or regulatory changes such as states choosing to alter the 
definition of a small firm from 50 to 100 workers. 
If the ACA is repealed, past and future research evaluating features of the law will still be 
informative for states interested in implementing a state-level health care reform, assuming they are 
given the chance to implement their own changes by a federal law replacing the ACA.  Notably, 
states will be able to use past research reviewed here and future research to understand whether 
and to what extent the ACA affected work and wages.  State policymakers can use that evidence to 
inform state-level decisions about a new, more decentralized form of health care reform.
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